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Abstract
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP)
(Dhillon et al., 2018) is a defense to adver-
sarial examples that was attacked and found to
be broken by the “Obfuscated Gradients” paper
(Athalye et al., 2018). We discover a flaw in the
re-implementation that artificially weakens SAP.
When SAP is applied properly, the proposed
attack is not effective. However, we show that a
new use of the BPDA attack technique can still
reduce the accuracy of SAP to 0.1%.
1. Introduction
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) (Dhillon et al., 2018)
is a proposed defense to adversarial examples. In their
work, Athalye et al. (2018) perform an analysis of SAP
and determine that it offers no robustness improvement on
top of a baseline model. We discover a flaw in the re-
implementation made by the authors that artificially weak-
ens SAP. A different attack technique is necessary to break
the correctly-implemented version of SAP.
2. Background
We assume familiarity with neural networks, methods to
generate adversarial examples, Stochastic Activation Prun-
ing, and the Backwards Pass Differentiable Approximation.
Notation. For a trained neural network f(·) evaluated on
some input x, an adversarial example x′ is constructed
by performing gradient ascent in the input-space to max-
imize the loss function ℓ(f(x′), y) (cross-entropy loss in
this case). This is done with the constraint that the distance
between x and x′ (the infinity norm is commonly used) is
small.
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) (Dhillon et al.,
2018) introduces randomness into the evaluation of a pre-
trained neural network by stochastically dropping out neu-
rons and setting their values to zero. Neurons are retained
with probabilities proportional to their absolute value.
*Equal contribution 1Amazon Web Services (this work is not
related to the author’s employment) 2Google Brain.
Let f = fd◦fd−1◦· · ·◦f1 denote a d-layer neural network.
We define hi ∈ Rmi to be the activations which result after
evaluating layer fi (with the non-linearity). We index each
activation as hij .
While performing the forward pass, SAP defines a multino-
mial probability distribution
pij = |h
i
j | ·
( mi∑
k=1
|hik|
)
−1
,
where pij is the probability of retaining h
i
j . ri neurons are
randomly sampled with replacement according to this prob-
ability distribution. The probability that hij is retained is
qij = 1− (1− p
i
j)
ri . To ensure that the total “mass” propa-
gating forward is preserved, SAP divides each node by the
probability of retaining it (similar to dropout), so that
hˆij =


hij
qi
j
if sampled
0 otherwise.
This process is repeated for every non-linear layer.
The choice of ri should be large enough that not too many
neurons are dropped (otherwise SAP would not be accurate
on clean data), but not so large that all neurons are retained
(otherwise SAP would do nothing). The authors suggest
setting ri to be equal to the width of the layer, i.e. mi.
Backwards Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA)
(Athalye et al., 2018) is an attack strategy that alters the
computation of the gradient of f with respect to the input
x, i.e. ∇xf(x). The forward pass is computed on the func-
tion f , but the backward pass is computed on a different
function g ≈ f such that the resulting gradient is neither
the gradient of f nor the gradient of g.
Specifically, let f i be a non-differentiable layer of a neural
network. To approximate∇xf(x), construct an approxima-
tion gi ≈ f i(x) of this layer. Then, approximate ∇xf(x)
by performing the forward pass through f(·) (in particular,
f i(x)), but on the backward pass, replace f i(x) with gi(x).
In general when multiple layers are non-differentiable we
select one gi per layer, and replace all of them in the back-
ward pass. As long as the two functions are similar, the
slightly inaccurate gradients still prove useful in construct-
ing adversarial examples.
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3. The Error of “Obfuscated Gradients ...”
The SAP paper explicitly states “the output of stochastic
models are computed as an average over multiple forward
passes” (Dhillon et al., 2018). When re-implementing the
SAP defense, the authors of Athalye et al. (2018) did not
include this step1. As a result, in order to maintain the clean
accuracy of approximately 83% as reported in Dhillon et al.
(2018), the value of ri had to be set to 2 × mi, which is
much larger than the prescribed value. Fixing this error in
the implementation is simple: setting the value of ri to mi,
and evaluating each test example by averaging the outputs
over 100 forward passes.
When this error is corrected, the attack described in
Athalye et al. (2018) is no longer effective; the accuracy
of SAP remains as is claimed in the paper.
Importantly, this error would not have been discovered
if not for the fact that both papers (Dhillon et al., 2018;
Athalye et al., 2018) released source code. We firmly be-
lieve that releasing source code is the only way to promote
correct and reproducible research, especially in the domain
of adversarial machine learning where – as is the case here
– setting a single hyper-parameter to the incorrect value can
have dramatic consequences.
There was a second difference that did not change the re-
sults. Instead of sampling exactly ri neurons per layer
from a multinomial distribution as in Dhillon et al. (2018),
Athalye et al. (2018) used a per-neuron binomial distri-
bution. This approximation is more efficient in high-
dimensional spaces while remaining close in performance.
When we attack a model that uses the latter approach, and
evaluate using the former, the attack success rate remains
unchanged.
4. Repairing the SAP Attack
When we run the attack code on the correctly-implemented
version of SAP, it fails to find an adversarial example in
most cases; even with over 10, 000 iterations of gradient
ascent, the targeted attack success rate remains below 50%
on CIFAR-10 at a distortion bound of ε = 0.031.
We therefore began to test for other signs of gradient mask-
ing as recommended by Athalye et al. (2018). We ran a
transfer attack where we generated adversarial examples
on the undefended model and then evaluate these adversar-
ial examples with SAP. The targeted attack success rate
is 70% on these. Part of the reason why this attack is
more successful is due to gradient masking. Intuitively this
makes sense as SAP introduces stochasticity on top of a pre-
trained model, behaving similar to the pre-trained model
1The author of this erratum, Nicholas Carlini, wrote the SAP
re-implementation and is solely responsible for the error.
while making the attack optimization difficult.
Given that gradients computed on the undefended model
effectively fool the defended model, we decided to try and
apply the BPDA2 strategy on SAP. By doing this, we query
the actual defended model, while only taking gradients
with respect to the original model. The concrete instantia-
tion of this attack removes the neuron-dropping completely
from the backward pass and just computes the gradients
on the vanilla neural network f , without any SAP compo-
nents; the forward pass retains the dropped neurons. As
mentioned earlier, we apply per-neuron binomial sampling
for efficiency, but test on the correct multinomial distribu-
tion.
We then evaluate the accuracy of SAP on CIFAR-10 with
a distortion bound of ε = 0.031. This modified attack is
sufficient to reduce the accuracy of SAP to 0.1% (±0.05%)
evaluated over the test set.
5. Conclusion
We discover a flaw in the evaluation of Athalye et al. (2018)
with regard to the implementation of Stochastic Activation
Pruning (Dhillon et al., 2018). When corrected, the origi-
nal attack is no longer effective. However, we slightly adapt
the attack to make use of BPDA and reduce the effective-
ness of SAP to 0.1% at ε = 0.031.
Papers which re-implement defenses must be extremely
careful when reproducing prior work to ensure that any
replications are exactly as described as in the original paper.
In this case, the error should have been discovered when
the replicated neural network required a different hyper-
parameter than described in the original paper. Fortunately,
the reason this discrepancy was discovered at all was that
both papers did release code (by publication time).
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2BPDA in general should not be treated as a magic black-box
that resolves all optimization difficulties. Since BPDA applies the
incorrect gradient, in many cases unless applied very carefully,
attacks perform worse with BPDA than without. In this particular
case we found it was helpful.
